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How New York State Stole $20 Billion from School Children in New York City 
The 2006 decision in Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York (CFE) required New York 
State to pay at least $1.93 billion more in annual operating aid to New York City. After issuing 
the decision, the Court of Appeals removed itself from oversite of this case and left the 
implementation to the State’s elected officials. 
These elected officials did increase aid to New York City in the years immediately 
following the CFE decision. As shown in Figure 1, aid per pupil increased for New York City in 
2008 and 2009, and it was higher than aid per pupil in the rest of the state in those years.1  By 
2010, however, it had dropped back down to the same level as the rest of the state and has 
been below that level ever since. Moreover, New York City’s share of total state aid has fallen 
far below its share of the state’s students, despite the temporary reversal of this situation right 
after the CFE decision. See Figure 2. 
At the time of the CFE ruling, 1,018,982 students attended the City’s schools, so one 
could also say that CFE decision required the state to increase its aid to New York City by $1.93 
billion divided by 1,018,982 students, which equals $1,894.08 per pupil. To make this figure 
comparable across years, it must be adjusted for inflation.2 The most recent accessible data on 
aid to New York City applies to the 2016-2017 school year, for budgets set in 2016 with 2016 
prices. The CFE mandate was set in 2006—in 2006 prices. Translated into 2016 prices, the 
$1,894.08 figure becomes $ 2,259.77.3 In other words, the CFE decision calls for an increase in 
                                                          
1 The data for Figures 1 and 2 can be found at: 
http://www.oms.nysed.gov/faru/Profiles/profiles_cover.html . 
 
2 Comparing figures in 2006 dollars with figures in 2016 dollars is like comparing apples and oranges. An 
inflation adjustment is critical. Moreover, the 2006 CFE decision explicitly recognizes that the $1.93 
figure “must be adjusted for inflation.” 
 
3 This calculation makes use of the consumer price index (available at: 
https://www.bls.gov/cpi/tables/supplemental-files/home.htm). The implicit price deflator for state and 
local government purchases (available at: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A829RD3Q086SBEA) is an 
alternative; it results in somewhat higher measures of aid shortfalls for NYC. 
 
aid to NYC in 2016-17 equal to $2,259.77 per pupil.4 With 1,018,982 pupils, this requirement 
calls for $2.303 billion in state aid above the 2007 baseline. In fact, however, state aid in 2016-
17 was only $0.095 billion about this baseline, leaving a gap of $2.302 billion – $0.095 billion = 
$2.208 billion. See Table 1. These calculations hold the number of pupils constant at the 2006-
2007 level. In fact, the number of pupils in New York City increased significantly over this 
period. As shown in Table 1, accounting for this increase raises the 2017 state aid gap to $2.436 
billion.5 
Two further adjustments are needed to calculate the state aid shortfall in earlier years. 
First, the $1.93 billion was expected to phase in over four years. Second, it seems reasonable to 
allow a lower aid increase in a recession year. The CFE decision did not mention this possibility, 
of course, but if the court had retained jurisdiction, it might well have allowed such an 
adjustment. State aid to districts outside New York City actually increased above the 2008 
baseline in the first recession year, 2009, by 2.4 percent, but it decreased almost 4 percent 
relative to this baseline in 2010. Moreover, constant-dollar spending outside the City did not 
exceed this baseline until 2016. To place a lower bound on the remaining gaps in state aid, my 
calculations assume a considerably larger reduction in the required minimum aid to New York 
City. To be specific, I reduce this minimum by 10 percent in 2009 and 25 percent in 2010, and 
then gradually return to the 2008 baseline with a 5 percent increase each year.  
The results of these calculations are presented in Table 1. After the phase-in of the 
increased aid to New York City and the recession, state aid to the City falls more than $2.1 
billion short of the CFE minimum in every year. The cumulative gap in actual aid compared to 
the required CFE minimum amounts to an astonishing $18.646 billion. Adding shortfalls for 
2018 and 2019 would bring this figure to at least $20 billion. Most of this gap reflects the failure 
of New York State to take the $1.93 billion requirement seriously, but $1.181 billion of it comes 
from the failure of New York State to account for the increased enrollment in New York City 
schools. In any case, these results demonstrate that the $1.93 billion aid increase in the CFE 
decision is nowhere in sight.6   
                                                          
4 The $1.93 billion comes from a calculation in which the level of school performance is fixed. One could 
also argue that the $1.93 billion should grow (in real terms) as the State’s school performance target 
grows. This approach is not pursued in this column. 
 
5 I am by no means the first person to point out New York State’s failure to meet its CFE obligations. See, 
for example, Stephanie D. Ashley, 2017, “New York’s Persistent Denial of New York City Educational 
Rights: Ten Years After Campaign For Fiscal Equity V. New York,” Seton Hall Law Review 47: 1045-1075. 
 
6 New York State might have increased aid to some other NYC department expecting the money that 
was thereby freed up to be spent on education. No sign of such a deal appears in the non-education 
state aid to NYC, which has not grown in real terms since 2007 (https://ibo.nyc.ny.us/fiscalhistory.html). 
Moreover, this approach does not meet the CFE mandate. 
Table 1. Shortfalls in Reaching CFE Spending Minima for NYC 
(in billions of 2016 dollars) 
Shortfall Based on Shortfall Due to 
2006-07 Pupil Increase in Pupils, 
Year Count  2007-2017 Total Shortfall 
2017 $2.208 $0.228 $2.436 
2016 $2.032 $0.201 $2.232 
2015 $2.653 $0.233 $2.886 
2014 $2.510 $0.158 $2.667 
2013 $2.867 $0.143 $3.010 
2012 $2.670 $0.118 $2.788 
2011 $2.047 $0.077 $2.124 
2010 $1.074 $0.028 $1.102 
2009 -$0.310 -$0.002 -$0.313 
2008 -$0.285 -$0.001 -$0.286 
Cumulative $17.465 $1.181 $18.646 
The results in Table 1 can be thought of as a lower bound because they assume that the 
CFE spending requirement is lowered substantially in recession years. This issue is not 
addressed in the CFE decision, so an alternative approach, which yields an upper bound, is to 
eliminate the recession adjustment. In this case, the gaps do not change in 2016 and 2017, but 
the cumulative gap increases by about $1.6 billion.  
In short, despite the CFE funding requirement, elected officials in New York State have 
returned to shortchanging school children in New York City. In recent years, annual state aid to 
New York City has fallen roughly $2.5 billion short of this requirement, and the cumulative 
shortfall now exceeds $20 billion. In a few more years, state aid may have increased enough in 
real terms so that these annual shortfalls disappear. Even in this case, however, the cumulative 
shortfall—$20 billion and counting—will remain unpaid. 
Shortfall = CFE required minimum aid increase minus actual aid above 
2006-07 level. The CFE minimum is phased in from 2008 to 2011. In 
addition, the CFE minimum is reduced in recession years (by 10% in 2009 
and 25% in 2010 and then phased back it at 5 percentage points per year). 
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Figure 1. State Education Aid Per Pupil, 
New York City and the Rest of New York State
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Figure 2. New York City's Share of Pupils 
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